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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43593 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2013-15145 
v.     ) 
     ) 
CODY EUGENE CUTHBERT, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Cody Cuthbert appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion for leniency following an order relinquishing jurisdiction.  He asserts 
that the district court did not sufficiently consider the fact that his issues in the rider 
program were due to his young age and associated immaturity, particularly in light of the 
fact that he had secured a sponsorer who was singularly qualified to help him address 
those issues moving forward.  As such, this Court should reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new determination on 
Mr. Cuthbert’s motion for leniency. 
 
 
2 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Cuthbert was nineteen years old while this case proceeded in the district 
court.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-19.)  He was described as immature, demonstrated by poor 
judgment in several respects.  (See, e.g., Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), pp.4, 20.)1  This played out in his decision to have a sexual relationship with a girl 
who Mr. Cuthbert believed, based on her representations in social media, she was 
sixteen, was only fourteen years old.  (R., pp.9, 91.)  As a result of that relationship, 
Mr. Cuthbert ultimately pled guilty to injury to children.  (R., pp.90-92.)  It was his first 
felony conviction.  (PSI, pp.29-31.)  However, he had problems accepting responsibility 
for his conduct in that regard.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.20 (the psychosexual evaluator noting 
that, while Mr. Cuthbert struggled to fully accept responsibility for his conduct, he was 
able to express remorse for his conduct).)   
 Nevertheless, the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Cuthbert so he might 
participate in a rider program.  (R., p.97.)  Unfortunately, Mr. Cuthbert’s immaturity 
prevented him from completing that program.  (See, e.g., Augmentation, pp.004-005 
(discussing the nature of Mr. Cuthbert’s formal disciplinary reports for contraband, 
indecent exposure, and horseplay).)2  As a result, after only being in his main rider 
program (the Sex Offender Assessment Group) for one month (Augmentation, p.003), 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
“CONFIDENTIAL CERTIFICATE OF EXHBIITS CUTBHERT 43593.”  Included in this 
file are the PSI report and all the documents attached thereto (police reports, 
psychosexual evaluation, etc.). 
2 Contemporaneous with this brief, Mr. Cuthbert has filed a motion to augment the 
record with the Addendum to the PSI prepared by the rider staff as a confidential 
exhibit.  The copy of that document has page numbers in the upper right hand corner of 
the page, starting at 002 and ending at 017. 
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the district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Cuthbert and executed his unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  (R., p.105.)   
 Mr. Cuthbert subsequently filed a timely motion for leniency pursuant to 
I.C.R. 35(b).  (R., pp.108-09.)  He provided two letters in support of that motion, one 
from himself providing his account of the incidents at the rider facility, and one from 
a sponsorer he had found who was willing to help him in his rehabilitative efforts.  
(Tr., p.5, Ls.15-17; Exhibits, pp.2-4.)3  The sponsorer explained he had met 
Mr. Cuthbert through Mr. Cuthbert’s sister, and he was singularly situated to help 
Mr. Cuthbert, as the sponsorer was a graduate of the drug court program himself, and 
so, understood what efforts were needed in this sort of rehabilitative process.  (Exhibits, 
p.3.)   
 Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion for leniency because of 
Mr. Cuthbert’s continuing struggles to accept responsibility and fully express remorse 
for his actions.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-6; R., p.113.)  However, in doing so, it recognized that 
Mr. Cuthbert’s struggles in the rider program were, at least in part, due to his age and 
maturity level.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.7-10.)  Mr. Cuthbert filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
order denying his motion for leniency.  (R., pp.115-17.) 
 
 
 
 
                                            
3 The letters Mr. Cuthbert submitted in support of his motion for leniency were provided 
in a separate PDF document, which will be cited as “Exhibits.” 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Cuthbert’s motion for 
leniency. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Cuthbert’s Motion For 
Leniency 
 
In denying Mr. Cuthbert’s motion for leniency, the district court focused on the 
fact that Mr. Cuthbert continued having problems expressing remorse and accepting 
responsibility for his actions in this case.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-10.)  However, those issues are 
only fully understood when viewed in light of Mr. Cuthbert’s whole character.  See, e.g., 
State v. Helms, 143 Idaho 79, 80 (Ct. App. 2006) (reiterating that sentencing decisions 
are to be reviewed while “focusing upon the nature of the offense and the character of 
the offender”).  Notably, Mr. Cuthbert was only eighteen years old at the time of the 
offense and only nineteen as the case proceeded through the district court.  (See, e.g., 
R., p.16; Tr., p.5, Ls.18-19.)  As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, a younger 
offender should be treated more leniently because he is still maturing. 
State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 
593, 595 (1982) (explaining that a defendant’s young age speaks significantly to his 
rehabilitative potential).   
Mr. Cuthbert is squarely in that category.  (See PSI, pp.4, 20.)  As the district 
court indicated, that immaturity was also evident in Mr. Cuthbert’s performance during 
his period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.7-10; see also Augmentation.)  
Therefore, a proper sentencing determination necessarily needed to sufficiently address 
Mr. Cuthbert’s immaturity in its evaluation of his character and the role it played in his 
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inability to accept responsibility.  Contrary to the district court’s conclusions, the 
psychosexual evaluator reported that Mr. Cuthbert had, in fact, expressed remorse for 
his actions.  (PSI, p.20.)   
Furthermore, Mr. Cuthbert presented new information with his motion for leniency 
which demonstrated he was in a better position to grow past that immaturity and learn to 
accept responsibility, and thus, begin fully rehabilitating.  See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 
812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010) (reaffirming that acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of 
responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation).  He had 
secured a sponsorer who, having been through a similar rehabilitation process himself, 
was singularly qualified to help Mr. Cuthbert in his efforts to rehabilitate.  (Exhibits, 
p.3-4.)  Additionally, since the sponsorer had become acquainted with Mr. Cuthbert 
through Mr. Cuthbert’s family, the sponsorer could help Mr. Cuthbert tap that support 
network to improve his rehabilitative potential as well.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.32-33, 43-44 
(letters of support from both Mr. Cuthbert’s parents); PSI, p.3 (the psychosexual 
evaluator noting the issues in the family while Mr. Cuthbert was growing up, including 
Mr. Cuthbert’s decision to serve time in a juvenile detention facility rather than return to 
his father’s home based on alleged physical abuse).) 
Since Mr. Cuthbert was in a better situation to begin maturing, and thus, 
rehabilitating, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion for leniency 
based on just the historical fact that Mr. Cuthbert has had problems in that area rather 
than giving sufficient consideration to the opportunity for Mr. Cuthbert to actually 
address that issue in a timely manner.  (See Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.23 (offering the 
district court several different sentencing alternatives which would allow for timely 
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rehabilitation).)  As both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have 
recognized, the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at 
sentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 
91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008).  Because the district 
court’s decision constituted an abuse of its discretion, this Court should vacate the order 
denying Mr. Cuthbert’s motion for leniency and grant relief as it deems appropriate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Cuthbert respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new ruling on his motion for leniency. 
 DATED this 9th day of March, 2016. 
 
      /s/_________________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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